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An Appropriate Constitutional Provision
For Dealing With Problems of Discrimination
IN ATTEMPTING to solve the problem of racial discrimination, the
courts and, more recently, Congress have relied upon the "Re-
construction Amendments"1 and the commerce clause2 as means of
legally guaranteeing the rights of citizenship to Negroes. It is the
purpose of this Note to trace the parallel development of antidis-
crimination measures under the fourteenth amendment and the
commerce clause and to determine which constitutional provision is
best suited to accomplish the desired end, or whether perhaps a
combination of the two might best eliminate discrimination. There
is even a possibility that neither of these provisions offers the ulti-
mate solution, for Congress may decide to assume a new role by
enacting legislation under section five of the fourteenth amend-
ment.3  Although this Note will focus upon the area of racial dis-
crimination, it is hoped that the following analysis will also serve
to illuminate the problems of discrimination generally in the United
States.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT
A logical starting point for a discussion of constitutional guar-
antees in the field of civil rights is section one of the fourteenth
amendment,4 because it purportedly conferred citizenship upon the
former slaves and established their civil liberties.5 Included in this
amendment are three well-known and often-used safeguards:
(1) the privileges and immunities clause, (2) the due process
clause, and (3) the equal protection clause. Because of the incon-
clusive nature of its legislative history and the continuing judicial
interpretation of its provisions, the fourteenth amendment has pro-
1U.S. CONST. amends. XIII-XV.
2U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
8 See note 42 infra.
4 All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the juris-
diction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
5 See Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?,
2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 138-39 (1949).
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vided limited assistance in the solution of contemporary problems
as compared with its potential as part of a growing constitution.
A. Destruction of the Privileges and Immunities Clause
The idea of protecting the privileges and immunities of citizen-
ship was incorporated in article IV, section 2, of the Constitution.'
An analysis of this provision was provided by Judge Washington
in Corfield v. Coryell,7 wherein he concluded that the delegates
were referring to privileges and immunities which are: "in their
nature fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all
free governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by
the citizens of the several states which compose this Union, from
the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign."' The
purpose of this article was to unite a loose confederation of states
into a single nation.? The courts, however, have limited the inter-
pretation of this clause to the protection of a citizen of one state
against discriminatory treatment under the laws of another state
where no substantial reason for the discrimination exists.1 In
short, article IV, section 2 affords protection against discrimination
to citizens of one state while in another state, with respect to those
privileges and immunities which are fundamental in a free society.
In 1868, the fourteenth amendment protection of privileges and
immunities of United States citizens was added to the Constitution.
The purpose of this clause was to make national citizenship the pri-
mary consideration in determining whether or not there was a viola-
tion of the privileges and immunities clause." Under this measure,
68 "he citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of
cizens in the several States." U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 2.
76 Fed. Cas. 546 (No. 3230) (C.CE.D. Pa. 1823).
8 Id. at 551. Judge Washington proceeded to enumerate these fundamental priv-
ileges and immunities:
Protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the
right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain
happiness and safety... The right of a citizen of one state to pass through,
or to reside in any other state,. . . to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas
corpus; to institute and maintain actions ... in the courts of the state;, to
take, hold, and dispose of property... and an exemption from higher taxes
or impositions than are paid by the other citizens of the state. Id. at 551-52.
See also WEAvEm, CONSTIUTiONAL LAW 130 (1946).
9 Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
10 Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 138 (1873): "The protection de-
signed by that clause, as has been repeatedly held, has no application to a citizen of
the State whose laws are complained of." See Toomer v. Witsell, supra note 9, at
395-96.
11 Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 182 (1941); Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S.
404, 427 (1953); 16 Amr. Jun. 2D Constitutional Law § 469, at 823 (1964).
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all citizens of the nation were protected against discriminatory treat-
ment by any state government. The amendment extended the cov-
erage of the original privileges and immunities clause to a greater
number of citizens, but it apparently did not expand the nature of
the privileges and immunities which required protection. The four-
teenth amendment has been judicially limited to privileges and im-
munities of national citizenship 2 and, as was pointed out in Colgate
v. Harvey,'" since privileges and immunities under article IV, section
2 "are derived exclusively from the Constitution and laws enacted
under it, the states were powerless to abridge them before the adop-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as after."' 4  Thus, al-
though no new safeguards were created by the amendment, all the
citizens of the nation were protected.
As a result of the manner in which the privileges and immuni-
ties clause has evolved, it has been of little use in combatting dis-
crimination on the state level and in the private sector where no
rights of national citizenship are involved. Rights derived from
state citizenship continue to rely upon state constitutions and judi-
ciaries for protection. In this situation, there is little the federal
government can do to aid its citizens, especially where the state gov-
ernment itself is responsible for the unfair treatment.
B. Due Process of Law
The concept of due process of law, or "the law of the land,"
originated in England sometime prior to the signing of the Magna
Carta.'5 In the United States, the guarantee has been afforded to
all citizens through the fifth and fourteenth amendments.'" Due
12 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 75 (1873). See also Colgate v.
Harvey, supra note 11, at 443 (dissenting opinion); MASON & BEANEY, THE SuPRMM
COURT IN A FREE SOCIETY 218 (1959). Mason and Beaney point out that "despite
the unlimited potentiality latent in the fourteenth amendment for the enhancement
of the Court's supervisory power, the Justices seemed ... reluctant to exploit this
new source of authority." The authors see the fourteenth amendment provision as
an opportunity to break down the dichotomy between state and national citizenship.
13 296 U.S. 404, 443 (1935).
14 Ibid. Some examples of rights to which the privileges and immunities clause
extends protection are found in the following cases: Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S.
78, 96 (1908) (right to peaceably assemble); Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 252
(1898) (taxed on the same basis as citizens of the forum state); Crandall v. Nevada,
73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 49 (1867) (the right to pass from state to state).
'
5 BRANDT, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 83 (1965); GRISwOLD, THE 5TH AMENDMENT
TODAY 31 (1955); WEAVER, op. cit. supra note 8, at 409.
16 "[N]or shall any person . . .be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V. "[NJor shall any State deprive any per-




process is not a term which fits into the confines of a concise and
readily understandable definition, but rather is a concept which de-
velops as history develops and yet provides stability to this process
of growth. It is in this context that Dean Griswold characterized
due process: TPerhaps it may be said that we are accustomed to de-
cent treatment from our public officers, and that our hearts and
minds recoil when this custom is broken. It is with this sort of
thing that the idea of due process, of the 'law of the land' is con-
cerned.""' In practice, the terms "arbitrary" or "oppressive" are
often associated with governmental acts which violate the standards
of due process.'" Thus, although each situation must be examined
with respect to its own facts, it may be said that any deprivation of
life, liberty, or property by arbitrary, capricious, or unjust action
would violate due process.
Due process, as it is understood today, refers to substantive as
well as procedural abuses. Procedural due process seeks to insure
that any proceeding which may deprive one of his right to life,
liberty, or property is conducted in a manner consistent with the
traditional, albeit abstract, notions mentioned above. 9 Two of the
primary values which procedural due process currently emphasizes
are: (1) the reliability of the guilt determining process;2" and
(2) respect for human dignity.2'
Substantive due process, on the other hand, seeks to protect in-
dividuals against arbitrary actions which work a deprivation of life,
liberty, or property irrespective of how correct the procedure may
be.m Again, there are two values which act as guides in an analysis
of substantive due process: first, whether the measure under attack
involves an end which the state may validly seek to accomplish; and,
second, whether reasonable means have been used to accomplish
17 GRISWOLD, op. cit. supra note 15, at 37-38.
sId. at 37; WEAVER, op. cit. supra note 8, at 411: "Any purely arbitrary, oppres-
sive, confiscatory, or capricious exercise of legislative power, amounting to a wrongful
invasion of liberty or property rights is not due process of law and is invalid."
19id. at 411:
The following requirements are generally considered essential elements of
due process: Notice, summons or other process; a hearing, and granting an
opportunity to be heard and to defend in an orderly proceeding before a court
or other tribunal having jurisdiction of the cause and which renders judgment
only after trial.
20 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319 (1937).
2 1 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2 2 BRANDT, op. dt. supra note 15, at 76; 16 AM. Jtu. 2D Constitutional Law 5
550, at 946 (1964).
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that end.'s If the state seeks to accomplish a valid end through rea-
sonable means, then the requirements of substantive due process are
probably met. During much of its existence, the concept of due
process has been restricted to the procedural aspect.24 It was not
until the economic regulation cases of the early part of this century
that substantive due process evolved as a curb to arbitrary depriva-
tions of life, liberty, and property by governmental action.25 In the
last decade, however, the emphasis has returned to procedural due
process with little attention being given to substantive matters.26
With the strict limitations placed on the privileges and im-
munities clause and the development of substantive due process, the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment has evolved as a
potent weapon in the solution of discrimination problems.27 How-
ever, the potential of even this provision has been stifled by the con-
cept of state action.28 The citizen thus appears to be adequately
protected against unjust deprivations of life, liberty, and property
by a state, but protection against private discrimination is less cer-
tain.
C. Equal Protection of the Laws
The authorities seem to be in general agreement that the equal
protection clause was added to the Constitution to insure that Ne-
groes would have the same civil rights that were enjoyed by the
white race.29 One might note at this point that unlike privileges
and immunities and due process of law, the equal protection guaran-
tee is found only once in the Constitution - in the fourteenth
amendment. There is no equivalent provision in the original Con-
stitution applicable to the federal government. Although equal
protection, like due process, is difficult to define in precise terms, it
23 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578
(1897); WEAVER, op. cit. supra note 8, at 410. "The courts have held that this amend-
ment includes such substantive rights as religious freedom, freedom of speech, freedom
of the press, the right of one accused of crime to have the benefit of counsl, as well as
the taking of private property by the states for public use without just compensation."
Ibid.
24 Fairman, supra note 5, at 164.
25 Id. at 165. See also Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
26 Fairman, supra note 5, at 9.
27 See text accompanying notes 6-26 supra.
28 See text accompanying notes 39-41 infra.
29 BRANDT, op. cit. supra note 15, at 325; MAsON & BEANEY, op. cit. supra note
12, at 254; WEAVER, op. cit. supra note 8, at 395; Fairman, supra note 5, at 138-39.
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has developed as a guarantee that people in similar situations will
be given similar treatment.30 At first blush this would seem to be
inconsistent with the very nature of legislation which often involves
the creation of rules proscribing the actions of certain groups or
classes. As Tussman and tenBroek point out, however, this incon-
sistency presents no obstacle in light of the doctrine of reasonable
classification.3 Legislation directed at a specific class does-not vio-
late the equal protection clause if the classification is based on rea-
son and is not arbitrary.3
As the other provisions of section one of the fourteenth amend-
ment were diluted by early and restrictive judicial interpretations,
so too did the phrase "equal protection of the laws" receive a severe-
ly limited interpretation. In 1896, the Supreme Court approved
of segregation on railroad cars so long as equal facilities were made
available to both races." For the next fifty years, this "separate
but equal" interpretation rendered the provision virtually useless in
accomplishing the ends which the drafters of the equal protection
clause had intended. But eventually the first visible signs of decay
began to develop in this economically infeasible doctrine.34 In
Sweatt v. Painter,5 the Supreme Court ruled that the separate Negro
law school at a Texas university was inadequate and not equal to
facilities for white students. Finally, in 1954, the Court overruled
the "separate but equal" doctrine in Brown v. Board of Educ.8 and
rekindled the fight against discriminatory treatment - one which
had begun in 1863 but which had been without success for almost
one hundred years.
3 0 Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341,
344 (1949).
31 In tackling this paradox the Court has neither abandoned the demand for
equality nor denied the legislative right to classify. It has taken a middle
course. It has resolved the contradictory demands of legislative specialization
and constitutional generality by a doctrine of reasonable classification. Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551-52 (1896); MASON & BEANEY, op. cit.
supra note 12, at 256; WnAvEa, op. cit. supra note 8, at 397.
34 McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950);
Sipuel v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Missouri ex
rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938). See also MASON & BEANEY, op. cit. supra
note 12, at 257.
sr 339 U.S. 629, 633-34 (1950).
36347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Court found that separate facilities were inherently
unequal. See also Turner v. Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (airport restaurant):
New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (public
golf course); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (desegrated buses); Holmes v.
City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (municipal golf course); Mayor of Baltimore
v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (public beaches and bath houses).
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As has been pointed out,3" there is no equal protection clause
which binds the federal government. However, an interplay has
developed between equal protection and due process. The two
dauses have in essence been read together, and a violation of equal
protection - namely, unreasonable or arbitrary classification - is
itself violative of due process. This argument was relied upon in
Boiling v. Sharpe,8 where the holding of the Brown case was ap-
plied to the desegregation of public schools in the District of Co-
lumbia. Despite this recent revival in the vitality of the equal pro-
tection clause, there remains the requirement of state action which,
just as with due process, renders it ineffective in combatting dis-
crimination in the private sector.
D. The Requirement of State Action
In addition to the restrictive interpretations given to the various
provisions of section one of the fourteenth amendment, the largest
single limitation on the use of these safeguards has been the con-
cept of state action. The words "no state shall" loom larger than
any single guarantee in the contemporary understanding of the
amendment. The significance of this limitation was first brought
to the fore in the Civil Rights Cases."9 Mr. Justice Bradley, speak-
ing for the majority, said: "Individual invasion of individual rights
is not the subject matter of this amendment."4 Under this doctrine,
the only violations of the guarantees discussed above which receive
protection are violations by the states through their various facilities.
Although the requirement of state action has been somewhat re-
laxed through interpretation, it still represents a substantial obstacle
in fighting discrimination in the private sphere.41
E. The Enforcement Provision
Finally, some reference should be made to section five of the
fourteenth amendment' which, unlike section one, has virtually no
traceable history. After the decision in the Civil Rights Cases,"
87 See text accompanying note 30 supra.
88 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
89 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
40 ld. at 11.
41 See text accompanying notes 108-15 infra.
42 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."
43 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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which invalidated civil rights legislation dealing with public accom-
modations based on the enforcement clause, section five was totally
disregarded until the Voting Rights Act of 1965. It is the rebirth
of section five in the area of discrimination - a direct result of the
Voting Rights Bill - which this Note seeks to explore 4
II. THE CommERCE CLAUSE
The commerce clause, found in article I, section 8, represents an
attempt by the Constitution's framers to eliminate one of the major
causes of disunity under the Articles of Confederation. They sought
to promote commercial intercourse among the several states and to
create a united national economy - a kind of eighteenth-century
common market.45 Although the Constitution gave Congress the
power to regulate commerce, it provided no guides as to the scope
of the power or the meaning of the term "commerce." Mr. Chief
Justice Marshall propounded a broad definition for the term in
Gibbons v. Ogden,4" in which he said: "Commerce, undoubtedly, is
traffic, but it is something more - it is intercourse. It describes
the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations,
in all its branches."4 Marshall also discussed the scope of the com-
merce clause:
It is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which
commerce is to be governed. This power, like all others vested in
congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost ex-
tent, and acknowledges no limitations, orher [sic] than are pre-
scribed in the constitution.48
In Gibbons, the Court held that an act of Congress regulating the
licensing of steamboats prevailed over a similar state act 9 In
Cooley v. Board of Wardens,' the federal government received con-
siderable leverage in the regulation of commerce through the
Court's analysis of the commerce power:
Subjects national in scope admit only of uniform regulations; these
require congressional legislation, and in the absence of such legisla-
tion the states cannot act. As to subjects of a local character, not
4 4 See text accompanying notes 120-24 infra.
4 5 Cooke, The Commerce Power, in 3 SELECrED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 45-46 (1938); MASON & BEANEY, op. cit. supra note 12, at 103.
4622 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
47 Id. at 83.
481d. at 86.
49 Id. at 239-40.
50 53 U.S. (12 How.) 318 (1851).
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requiring uniform legislation, the states may legislate until Con-
gress, by acting on the same subject, displaces the state law.5'
The next major development in the history of the commerce
clause permitted regulation of activities which were purely intrastate
in nature but which had a direct effect on interstate commerce. 52
The idea emerged from the case of Houston, E. & W. Ry. v. United
States,5 in which a railroad charged lower rates between intrastate
points than the rates established by the Interstate" Commerce Com-
mission. However, this principle was held inapplicable in cases
where intrastate activities had only an indirect effect on interstate
commerce. 4  This development reached its logical end in Wickard
v. Filburn,55 the Court holding that although one man's individual
contribution to interstate commerce may not be substantial, when
considered together with the contributions of those similarly situ-
ated, it becomes substantial. 5 It was a refinement of this last in-
terpretation which brought the commerce clause into the battle
against private discrimination in the 1964 Civil Rights Act.5
In addition to the development of the commerce power's scope
vis vis intrastate and interstate activity, the nature of the activities
regulated expanded into a kind of federal police power. Congress
began exercising its authority under the commerce clause to accom-
plish ends which were morally and socially desirable. 9 In Champ-
ion v. Ames,6" the Court upheld federal legislation prohibiting the
distribution of lottery tickets in interstate commerce. Mr. Justice
Harlan pointed out that since this was an interstate problem, no
single state could take effective action to eliminate the evil: "We
should hesitate long before adjudging that an evil of such appalling
character, carried on through interstate commerce, cannot be crushed
by the only power competent to that end."'" Under this interpre-
r1 MASON & BEANEY, op. cit. supra note 12, at 114.5 2 Houston, B. & W. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
53 Ibid.
54 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546 (1935).
55 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
56 Id. at 127-28.
5 7 Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). Both of these cases considered the effect on inter-
state commerce of discrimination practiced by interstate operations.
58 Cushman, The National Police Power Under the Commerce Clause of the Con-
stitution, 3 MINN. L. REv. 289 (1919).
59 MASON & BEANEY, op. cit. supra note 12, at 157.
60 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
61 Id. at 357-58.
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tation, Congress could regulate any item in interstate commerce
which it considered tainted with some moral or social evil.6" Thus,
the clause has developed from the regulation of intercourse among
the states to the regulation of any activity - social, economic, or
moral - which may have a substantial effect on interstate com-
merce.
III. ANTIDISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION AND THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE
A. The Cases
(1) Edwards v. California.6 -In Edwards the petitioner had
been convicted of violating a state statute which made the inten-
tional bringing of non-resident indigents into the state a misde-
meanor. The Supreme Court held that this statute, discriminating
against indigent persons and enacted under the state's police power,
was "an unconstitutional barrier to interstate commerce."" The
Court further held that the transportation of indigent persons across
state lines is an activity to be controlled by a single national au-
thority."5 The most interesting aspect of the decision is the con-
curring opinions which question the relevancy of the commerce
clause to factual situations involving discriminatory treatment of
United States citizens. Mr. Justice Douglas wrote: "I am of the
opinion that the right of persons to move freely from State to State
occupies a more protected position in our constitutional system than
does the movement of cattle, fruit, steel and coal across state
lines."6  Douglas felt that the right to move from state to state
was one of those privileges and immunities which is inherent in na-
tional citizenship and protected by the fourteenth amendment.
Mr. Justice Jackson, also concurring, suggested that a human
being with nothing to sell and no money with which to buy was
isolated from traditional notions of commerce.6" Like Douglas,
62 See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (goods produced under
substandard labor conditions); Brown v. United States, 267 U.S. 432 (1925) (stolen
automobiles banned in interstate commerce); Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry.,
242 U.S. 311 (1917) (transportation of alcohol into a dry state); Hoke v. United States,
227 U.S. 308 (1913) (transporting women in interstate commerce for immoral pur-
poses); Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911) (adulterated food).
63314 U.S. 160 (1941).
64 Id. at 173.
O)Id. at 176.
66 Id. at 177 (concurring opinion).
67 Id. at 182 (concurring opinion).
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Jackson relied on section one of the fourteenth amendment, point-
ing out that the right of travel among the states is not absolute, and
where it is limited the restrictions must be reasonable and not irrele-
vant or based on "neutral" grounds such as indigence, race, creed,
or color.6" The logical approach of the concurring Justices, there-
fore, would rely upon the fourteenth amendment to protect human
rights rather than extending the commerce clause into this area.
(2) Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States.6 9-In 1964,
subsequent to race rioting in the South, a Negro march on
Washington, and innumerable protest demonstrations, Congress
passed the first substantial antidiscrimination legislation since the
days of Reconstruction. Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
sought to eliminate discrimination in the area of public accommo-
dations.7" The Heart of Atlanta Motel case involved a small,
downtown Atlanta motel which advertised outside the state and
registered seventy-five percent of its customers from other states.
The proprietor refused to rent rooms to Negroes, and a declaratory
judgment action was filed to have the act declared unconstitutional.
The Court indicated early in its opinion that Congress intended to
base this legislation on section five and the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment as well as the commerce clause.71
After a thorough discussion of the legislation and its history, the
majority proceeded to uphold its constitutionality based on the com-
merce clause.7" Mr. Justice Clark conceded that Title II was in-
tended to deal with a moral wrong, but he ignored that fact be-
cause of the "overwhelming evidence of the disruptive effect that
racial discrimination has had on commercial intercourse.""8  The
Court reasoned, based on the history of the commerce power, that
68 Id. at 184-85 (concurring opinion).
69 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
70 "All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, ser-
vices, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public
accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the
ground of race, color, religion, or national origin." Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 201 (a),
78 Star. 243, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (1964).
71 379 U.S. at 249.
72 Id. at 250. In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Goldberg cited the Senate Com-
merce report:
"The primary purpose of ... [the Civil Rights Act], then, is to solve this
problem, the deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials
of equal access to public establishments. Discrimination is not simply dollars
and cents, hamburgers and movies; it is the humiliation, frustration, and em-
barrassment that a person must surely feel when he is told that he is unac-




the movement of people across state lines is interstate commerce
and that although the Heart of Atlanta Motel may be a local, intra-
state operation, its discriminatory practices may have "a substantial
and harmful effect upon that commerce," and Congress is therefore
authorized to regulate it.74 The legislative history of Title II indi-
cated that discrimination in public accommodations made it diffi-
cult, if not impossible, for Negroes to find suitable lodging while
away from home and thus discouraged them from traveling"
The case of Katzenbach v. McClung" dealt with the constitu-
tionality of the act as it applied to a Birmingham, Alabama, restau-
rant. Ollie's Barbecue, a small restaurant located some distance
from any interstate highway, served primarily the local community.
No Negroes were served in the restaurant, although the proprietor
did provide a take-out service which was available to them. The
most significant factor in this decision was that forty-six percent of
the meat which Ollie's Barbecue bought locally had moved through
the channels of interstate commerce.77 The district court found
that the state of Alabama was not involved in the discrimination
practiced by Ollie's and that since no "state action" was involved,
the fourteenth amendment was inapplicable.7 The Supreme Court,
in applying Title II to Ollie's Barbecue, again relied on the legisla-
tive history of the bill to supply the requirement of "reasonableness"
to the means used to accomplish the desired end.79 This examina-
tion indicated that because of discriminatory practices in facilities
serving interstate goods, Negroes were discouraged from traveling
and, therefore, fewer interstate goods would be sold than if discrimi-
nation did not exist.8" As in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States,"' the Court used a quantitative approach to the commerce
74 Id. at 258.
5 Id.at 253. Mr. Justice Clark, writing for the majority, stated:
This testimony indicated a qualitative as well as quantitative effect on inter-
state travel by Negroes. The former was the obvious impairment of the
Negro traveler's pleasure and convenience that resulted when he continually
was uncertain of finding lodging. As for the latter, there was evidence that
this uncertainty stemming from racial discrimination had the effect of dis-
couraging travel on the part of a substantial portion of the Negro community.
... [Tlhe voluminous testimony presents overwhelming evidence that dis-
crimination by hotels and motels impedes interstate travel. Ibid.
76 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
77 Id. at 296.
78 Id. at 297.
791d. at 299-301.
80 Id. at 300.
81 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
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clause for the purpose of guaranteeing human rights to Negroes.82
Under this analysis, the civil rights of a Negro family living next
door to Ollie's Barbecue are totally dependent upon how much food
the restaurant buys through the channels of interstate commerce.
Twenty-three years after his opinion in Edwards,8" Mr. Justice
Douglas, joined by Mr. Justice Goldberg, again voiced dissatisfac-
tion with a decision which relies upon the commerce clause to pro-
tect basic civil liberties. He contended that a holding based on
section five of the fourteenth amendment would limit obstructionist
litigation over the commercial definitions of inn, restaurant, and
interstate traveler. Douglas wrote: "Under my construction, the
Act would apply to all customers in all enumerated places of public
accommodation." '84 In his brief concurring opinion, Mr. Justice
Goldberg substantially enhanced the meaning of section five of the
fourteenth amendment when he wrote:
[Section] 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees to all Amer-
icans the constitutional right "to be treated as equal members of
the community with respect to public accommodations," and ...
"Congress [has] authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, or under the Commerce Clause... to implement the rights
protected by § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5
The opinions of Douglas and Goldberg indicate dissatisfaction with
the use of the commerce power in antidiscrimination legislation, ap-
parendy because of the tenuous connection between the protection
of human rights and a constitutional provision intended to establish
a unified national economy. Although there may be some small
connection between discrimination at Ollie's Barbecue and the flow
of interstate goods, the purpose of the act was the elimination of
discriminatory practices. And what result will obtain in factual situ-
ations where commerce is clearly not involved? Are human rights
to be ignored?
B. The Logical Result
If the Court should decide to expand its recent interpretation of
the commerce clause into other areas, there exist innumerable sub-
82 See note 75 supra.
83 Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
84 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 280 (1964) (con-
curring opinion). (Emphasis added.)
851d. at 293 (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Goldberg, quoting from his
opinion in Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 317 (1964)). His reference to the com-
merce clause includes only the basis of the majority opinion which he does not feel
is the best approach.
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jects which could be regulated with slight if any relation to the
common notions of commerce. The argument as established in the
discrimination cases would take the following form. Congress has
the power to regulate commerce among the states."6 The quantity
of goods flowing in interstate commerce is adversely affected by the
practice of racial discrimination.87 Therefore, Congress has the
power to prohibit the practice of racial discrimination. If it should
find that astronomical motel rates or the excessive prices charged by
restaurants selling interstate goods impair the flow of goods (as
well as people) in interstate commerce, then, applying the above
argument, valid price control legislation could be enacted based on
the commerce power. A more extreme, albeit a permissible, exten-
sion would allow Congress to control aesthetics under the commerce
power. If one could show that citizens shy away from travel or
purchase of interstate goods because of poorly designed buildings
or highways obliterated with billboards, Congress could intervene
and regulate these areas under the authority of the commerce clause.
This appears to be the logical, though somewhat disturbing, result
of a substantially quantitative approach to the commerce power. In
an extreme situation perhaps this kind of justification may be neces-
sary, but there exists some doubt as to its necessity in the area of
racial discrimination.
IV. ANTIDISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION AND
SECTION FIVE
A. The Cases
(1) United States v. Guest.S--Guest and his fellow defend-
ants were charged with conspiring to deprive Negroes of the en-
joyment of their constitutional rights under a federal statute."9 Part
II of Mr. Justice Stewart's opinion deals with that portion of the in-
86 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
8 7 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 253 (1964); Katzen-
bach v. McCung, 379 U.S. 294, 300 (1964).
88 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
89 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1964) provides:
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate
any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured
to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his
having so exercised the same; or
If two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises
of another, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of
any right or privilege so secured -
They shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than
ten years, or both.
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dictment which charged the defendant with conspiring to deprive
Negroes of the right to use state-operated facilities in Athens,
Georgia. The opinion points out that this was a private conspiracy
and no one "acted in any way under the color of state law."90 Stew-
art avoided section five by construing the statute involved as incor-
porating the equal protection clause and nothing more."
According to the traditional interpretation of the fourteenth
amendment, the equal protection clause is only effective against state
action. Stewart felt that this requirement was met.92  He reasoned
that the filing of false criminal charges against Negroes by a pri-
vate conspiracy which brings state law enforcement agencies into
action constitutes sufficient affirmative state action to invoke the
equal protection clause. Although Stewart wrote the majority
opinion, he was in a definite minority in his argument supporting
reversal of the dismissed indictment on this ground.
A majority of the Court was of the opinion that Congress, un-
der section five may "enact laws punishing all conspiracies to inter-
fere with the exercise of fourteenth amendment rights, whether or
not state officers or others acting under the color of state law are
implicated in the conspiracy."93  For the first time, a majority felt
that section five was intended as more than a measure to authorize
remedial congressional legislation only after the Court had found
the actions of a particular state violative of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Equally significant is the idea that this positive grant of
power to Congress is not limited by the doctrine of state action. If
a private conspiracy may be indicted for interfering with the rights
of Negroes in their enjoyment of state facilities, why could not the
90 United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 754 (1966).
91Id. at 754-55.
92 Id. at 756.
93 Id. at 782 (concurring opinion). Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion, in which
Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Douglas joined, continues:
Although the Fourteenth Amendment itself, according to established doc-
trine, "speaks to the State or to those acting under the color of its authority,"
legislation protecting rights created by that Amendment, such as the right to
equal utilization of state facilities, need not be confined to punishing con-
spiracies in which state officers participate. Rather, § 5 authorizes Congress
to make laws that it concludes are reasonably necessary to protect a right
created by and arising under that Amendment; and Congress is thus fully em-
powered to determine that punishment of private conspiracies interfering with
the exercise of such right is necessary to its full protection. Ibid. (Emphasis
added.)
Mr. Justice Clark, joined by Justices Black and Forms, stated: "ITJhere now can
be no doubt that the specific language of § 5 empowers the Congress to enact laws
punishing all conspiracies - with or without state action - that interfere with Four-
teenth Amendment rights." Id. at 762 (concurring opinion).
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same group be indicted for similar conspiracies in other areas of
discrimination?
4
(2) Katzenbach v. Morgan.95 -In the summer of 1965, only
one year after the enactment of the civil rights legislation involved
in Heart of Atlanta Motel,"8 Congress enacted another significant
civil rights measure designed to protect voting rights against dis-
crimination.9" Two New York residents brought an action attack-
ing the constitutionality of section four of the act because it pro-
hibited the use of literacy tests which were required by New York
law. The lower court held the act unconstitutional on the ground
that it was beyond the power granted to Congress and violated the
tenth amendment"8 The Supreme Court reversed, and the opinion
written by Mr. Justice Brennan stated: "By including § 5 the drafts-
men sought to grant to Congress, by a specific provision applicable
to the Fourteenth Amendment, the same broad powers expressed in
the Necessary and Proper Clause .... "" The Court held that sec-
94 Mr. Justice Harlan disagreed with the policy behind this extension of the four-
teenth amendment
If the State obstructs free intercourse of goods, people, or ideas, the bonds
of union are threatened; if a private group effectively stops such communica-
tion, there is at most a temporary breakdown of law and order, to be remedied
by the exercise of state authority, or by appropriate federal legislation. Id.
at 772.
98 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
96 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
97 Voting Rights Act of 1965, 5 4(e), 79 Stat. 438, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a)-(8)
(Supp. I. 1966):
(1) Congress hereby declares that to secure the rights under the fourteenth
amendment of persons educated in American-flag schools in which the pre-
dominant classroom language was other than English, it is necessary to pro-
hibit the States from conditioning the right to vote of such persons on ability
to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter in the English language.
(2) No person who demonstrates that he has successfully completed the
sixth primary grade in a public school in, or a private school accredited by,
any state, or territory, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico in which the predominant classroom language was other than
English, shall be denied the right to vote in any Federal, State, or local elec-
tion because of his inability to read, write, understand or interpret any matter
in the English language, except that in States in which State law provides
that a different level of education is presumptive of literacy, he shall demon-
strate that he has successfully completed an equivalent level of education in a
public school in, or a private school accredited by, any State or territory, the
District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in which the pre-
dominant classroom language was other than English.
9 8 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 646 (1966).
99 Id. at 650. "The classic formulation of those powers was established by Chief
Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland, ... : 'let the end be legitimate, let it be
within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and
spirit of the constitution, are constitutional."' Ibid.
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tion five gave Congress a grant of power to insure the Puerto Rican
minorities of New York City the right to vote and found a rational
basis upon which Congress had made its judgment that the literacy
test deprived those groups mentioned in section four of equal pro-
tection of the laws.1"0
Mr. Justice Harlan, joined by Mr. Justice Stewart, dung to the
orthodox view that section five is applicable after the judiciary has
decided whether a particular state act infringes upon the guarantees
of the amendment.' This view is somewhat puzzling, for if the
Court declares the state action invalid, there is nothing for Congress
to do under section five. Apparently, Mr. Justice Harlan's primary
concern with the majority opinion was that Congress may be able
to dilute as well as expand the protections of the amendment
through section five."0 2 Mr. Justice Brennan responded to this
possibility in a footnote: "We emphasize that Congress' power un-
der § 5 is limited to adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of
the Amendment; section 5 grants Congress no power to restrict,
abrogate, or dilute these guarantees. '  Thus, any legislation by
the Congress under section five which tended to restrict the amend-
ment's provisions would be found unreasonable by the Court and
declared invalid. A fair reading of Katzenbach v. Morgan °4 sup-
ports the conclusion that Congress has an implied power to enact
laws necessary to insure the express guarantees of the fourteenth
amendment so long as the legislation is reasonable.
B. The New Approach
(1) A "Necessary and Proper" Clause in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.-Katzenbach v. Morgan.. represents a breakthrough in
eliminating the traditional restrictive notions of the fourteenth-
amendment protections. The battle against discrimination should
now shift from the Court to the legislature because Congress is not
limited to prohibiting only those actions by the states which violate
equal protection, due process, or privileges and immunities; but may
now enact laws which are necessary to insure these guarantees to
all citizens. This new concept is consistent with the argument
100 Id. at 656.
101 Id. at 666 (dissenting opinion).
102 Id. at 668 (dissenting opinion).
1D3 Id. at 651 n.10. (Emphasis added.)




made by Frantz: "[Tjhe theoretical approach is that the amendment
creates affirmative rights in individuals, not merely restraints upon
the states."' 8
(2) The Erosion of State Action.-Before looking at the ef-
fect of the new approach on the state action doctrine, it is necessary
to examine the extent to which this doctrine has developed since
its inception in the Civil Rights Cases.' Although the state action
doctrine has been a hindrance in fighting discrimination, it has
eroded to the point where it now exists only as a legal fiction.'
Apparently, the slightest connection with state authority will sup-
port a finding of state action. The requirement has been satisfied
where a state court enforced a racially restrictive covenant,0 9 and
where a private organization had undertaken the performance of a
governmental function."' State action was also found where a
state leased facilities in its parking garage to a private concern."'
One author suggests that the analysis in these cases should be
directed to an "evaluation of the personal right to discriminate as
against the public's concern for the elimination of discrimination."'
Professor Thomas Lewis, on the other hand, warns that without state
action "the concept of constitutional rights would potentially spill
over into the whole domain of traditionally private affairs, and the
courts could easily be forced into the position of drawing lines
founded on artificial distinction.""' 8 Since state action is no longer
anything but a fiction, and since some tenuous connection with the
state must be invented to circumvent this fiction in enforcing four-
108 Frantz, Congressional Power To Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment Against
Private Acts, 73 YALE LJ. 1353, 1375 (1964). See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100
U.S. 303, 310 (1879).
107 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
19 8 MILLEt, THE PEITIONERS: THE STORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES AND THE NEGRO 415 (1966).
109 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
110 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (private corporation owns and governs
a town); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941) (a private political organization
exercised control over the right to vote).
Ill Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (coffee shop
renting space in a municipal garage). But see Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157,
183-85 (1961) (concurring opinion), in which Mr. Justice Douglas expressed the view
that a private person cannot discriminate if he depends on a state license authorizing
him to do business.
112Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TEXAS L REV. 347, 380 (1963).
113 Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLUM L REV. 1083, 1098 (1960).
It is suggested that perhaps Professor Lewis would not be as concerned about the
elimination of state action if the legislature, and not the courts, were fighting dis-
crimination and drawing the distinctions.
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teenth amendment guarantees there seems no good reason for re-
taining this restrictive device. Katzenbach v. Morgan. 4 offers the
courts and the Congress an opportunity to abandon the state action
doctrine, as suggested in the Guest case."'
C. The Logical Result
Congress now has the affirmative power under section five of
the fourteenth amendment to enact all laws necessary and proper
to insure every citizen the guarantees of section one of the amend-
ment. Congress may now weigh the factors of discrimination in
housing and perhaps enact legislation guaranteeing equal treatment
to Negroes in the selection of housing." 6 Again, the individual's
right to discriminate must be balanced against a public interest in
eliminating discrimination." 7  Congress might also attack discrimi-
nation in the South practiced through a system of private schools
instead of the usual public schools. The Negro and indigent white
youth in these states are being deprived of the opportunity to re-
ceive an education because of an unreasonable classification."18 In
addition to national fair housing legislation and the elimination of
discrimination in private Southern schools, the doctrine of state ac-
tion may be abandoned, as previously pointed out."9 The legislative
branch may act to prevent all types of discrimination in the area of
criminal procedure and any other area where the rights of a United
States citizen are violated.
V. THE APPROPRIATE PROVISION
The parallel treatment of the constitutional safeguards of basic
civil liberties which have developed should afford some insight into
their future application in dealing with contemporary problems.
The historical development in the area of civil rights coupled with
"4 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
1"5 United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
116 18 W. REs. L. REv. 328, 338 (1966). The writer also suggests that national
fair housing legislation could be based on the commerce power, since materials used
in the building trade generally move in interstate commerce. Id. at 336.
117 See text accompanying note 105 supra. The legislative branch is better able
to balance the many factors and to judge the public interest in eliminating discrimina-
tion.
118 It is suggested that this could be accomplished despite the state action requite-
ment since these private schools are carrying on a traditionally public function -
education. See United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
11 See text accompanying notes 108-15 supra.
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the Morgan case ° indicates that it is time to unshackle the four-
teenth amendment from outdated interpretations and utilize its pro-
visions for the purposes intended.
Although there is a good deal of dispute over the amendment's
legislative history,'2' it was apparently aimed at protecting human
rights. On the other hand, the avowed purpose of the commerce
clause was to insure the development of a unified national econ-
omy'
22
If the approach of "purpose interpretation" as outlined in
Heydon's Case2' is followed, it is clear that the fourteenth amend-
ment must prevail as the appropriate safeguard of individual civil
liberties. The advantage of the amendment's provisions is even
more obvious in the case of an unusual fact situation where the
problem clearly involves discrimination but it is unique and thus
devoid of precedent. Under the purpose-interpretation approach,
the fourteenth amendment might be creatively expanded to solve
numerous problems. Following the same reasoning, the promotion
of interstate commerce is a purpose which is severely limited in its
application to discrimination problems. Comparing the purposes
behind these constitutional provisions, it seems dear that the four-
teenth amendment, rather than the commerce clause, will lead to
more creative and well-reasoned solutions to the problems of dis-
crimination.
In addition, the use of the fourteenth amendment will enable
responsible officials to give the public more credible, and thus more
acceptable, explanations for the actions taken. A significant result
of the recent decisions is a shifting of the forum from the Court to
the Congress. The fine distinctions which must be drawn in this
area are matters for the legislature, a body over which the people
have some measure of control. No longer will it be necessary for
nine individual Justices to solve the problems created by discrimina-
tory practices. The Court can return to its neutral role of review-
ing the measures adopted in light of the principles of equal protec-
tion, due process, and the like.'24 Congress, with its responsibility
.20 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
121 FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1908); Fairman,
Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5
(1949).
122 See text accompanying note 45 supra.
-
23 Heydon's Case, 3 Coke 7a, 76 En& Rep. 637, 638 (1584).
124 See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L
REv. 1 (1959).
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to the American people, can use the fourteenth amendment to pre-
sent well-reasoned and credible explanations for decisions and legis-
lation in the area of civil rights.
Reliance upon the fourteenth amendment will make it unneces-
sary to give an involved and detailed presentation regarding the
meaning of a quantitative approach to the commerce power. It
will not be necessary to attempt to convince the proprietor of Ollie's
Barbecue that where he buys his supplies determines whether or not
he must serve Negroes. Although prejudice will continue to hamper
ready acceptance of antidiscrimination measures, the use of the
fourteenth amendment should give society an acceptable alternative
to the beliefs of the past. No longer need it appear that those seek-
ing advances in civil rights can only justify their position through
absurd applications of constitutional provisions that bear little or
no relation to the problem.
Legislation based on the fourteenth amendment could also have
an important psychological impact on oppressed minorities. In our
complex technological world, the notion of mass society, resulting
in the obliteration of all individual rights, has developed. The force
of the mass society is especially felt by the poor and the oppressed.
In addition to being denied basic civil liberties, society has deprived
them of dignity and self-respect. It must be this loss of dignity and
the fear of mass society which led large numbers of poor Negroes
to abandon the peaceful protest and take to the streets in rioting
and violence. While it is true that advances were made through
nonviolence, the advances did not come in the framework of the in-
dividual's rights. In guaranteeing civil rights, the Supreme Court
has generally based its findings on a consideration of the Negro as
an economic unit in a mass society, and the effect of those units on
interstate commerce determined the availability of human rights.
However, if the American Negro feels that he is being protected
against oppression as an individual and not as the purchaser of so
many hamburgers, the natural result will be a feeling of dignity as
a human being. Such a person would not be easily drawn to violent
and lawless activities. Obviously, this will not end the problem, but
an emphasis on the individual in this area may point the way to a
similar emphasis in other areas and dilute the dangers of the so-
called mass society.
There are those who will immediately charge that the above
analysis is a gross violation of states' rights and must lead to the
downfall of the federal system. To this charge there are two an-
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swers. First, the federal-state relations of 1960 are vastly different
from what they were in 1790 or 1870, and although it is not sug-
gested that the federal system be abandoned, it is suggested that
the states today have a new and different relationship with the fed-
eral government and this new relationship needs fresh evaluation.
In addition, under the above analysis, the federal government has
not usurped state functions but has merely guaranteed the right of
all citizens to participate in those functions. It seems that Congress
has broad powers under section five, but they are not unrestricted
powers and the test of reasonableness looms large as a protection
for the states. Although section five, if used unwisely, may present
a danger to the federal system, it is suggested that a continued denial
of basic civil rights presents an even greater danger to that system.
VI. CONCLUSION
Traditionally, the commerce clause and section one of the four-
teenth amendment have shared the task of combatting discrimina-
tion in this country. The fourteenth amendment has protected basic
civil liberties against abridgment by state action, while the com-
merce power has governed all types of discrimination where inter-
state commerce was involved. Recent cases have added new vigor
to section five of the fourteenth amendment, making it apparent
that Congress can enact legislation to eliminate private acts of dis-
crimination even where commerce is not involved. The close con-
nection between human rights and the fourteenth amendment and
the deficiencies inherent in measures enacted under the commerce
clause suggest that future antidiscrimination legislation should be
based on section five of the fourteenth amendment.
CHARxLS P. ROSE, J%.
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